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Auditing for Fraud: Perception vs. Reality 
Alan J. Winters 
American Institute of CPAs 
John B. Sullivan 
Deloitte & Touche* 
When you come to a fork in the road, take it. 
Yogi Berra 
Many people, both in and out of the accounting profession, would say that Mr. 
Berra's aphorism has guided the evolution of the auditor's responsibility to detect 
fraud. Throughout its history, the profession has taken various positions on this 
responsibility; sometimes adopting a position, abandoning it, and then returning to it. 
This erratic evolution has been propelled largely by two factors. One factor is the 
vagaries of auditors' beliefs about (1) what degree of fraud detection responsibility is 
commensurate with an auditor's professional obligation and (2) what technical 
prowess auditors command to detect fraud. The other factor is what responsibility the 
public, in the form of users of the auditor's product; regulators and legislators; courts; 
and financial press writers, expect auditors to assume. 
This paper begins with a summarized history of the evolution of the auditor's 
responsibility to detect fraud in financial statement audits, including both nonauthori-
tative and authoritative guidance and major influences outside the profession. We then 
provide a critique of the effectiveness of audit approaches for detecting fraud. Finally, 
we offer some suggestions for modifying those approaches and improving their effec-
tiveness. 
Progression of Professional Guidance-Nonauthoritative and Authoritative 
From ancient times until around the turn of the twentieth century, auditing's 
primary objective was to detect fraud and the technique used was detailed examina-
tion rather than selective testing (Brown 1962). For example, the prevention and 
detection of fraud underlay the "hearing" of accounts during the Roman Empire as 
well as audits of companies during the Industrial Revolution (Brown 1962). 
During the five years that preceded and followed the turn of the twentieth century, 
the primary objective of auditing began to shift. Contrasting passages from two promi-
nent auditing texts issued seven years apart illustrate this shift. 
"The object of an audit may be said to be three-fold: 
1. The detection of fraud. 
2. The detection of technical errors. 
3. The detection of errors of principle." (Dicksee 1905) 
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the AICPA or 
Deloitte & Touche. 
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"In what might be called the formative days of auditing, students were taught that 
the chief objects of an audit were: 
1. Detection and prevention of fraud. 
2. Detection and prevention of errors, but in recent years there has been a decided 
change in demand and service. 
Present-day purposes are: 
1. To ascertain actual financial condition and earning of an enterprise. 
2. Detection of fraud and errors, but this is a minor objective." (Montgomery 
1912) 
In addition to the shift in audit objective, there was a move away from detailed 
examination of virtually every transaction toward selective testing. This change 
occurred because of the growing size of audited entities and the accompanying 
impracticability of detailed verification. Also, auditors began to recognize internal 
control and its relationship to testing and also to develop audit sampling techniques. 
Thus, both the objective of audits and the techniques used to perform them trans-
formed. 
The transition in the practicing profession's stance on the auditor's responsibility 
for detecting fraud continued until the first authoritative recognition of this responsi-
bility in 1951 in Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure (AICPA 1951). 
Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure: The Codification stated that 
an audit is not designed and cannot be relied on to disclose fraud. It emphasized that 
primary responsibility for detecting fraud lies with adequate systems of accounting 
and internal control. It also indicated that if the auditor becomes suspicious of the 
client's integrity, he or she must extend audit procedures to determine whether those 
suspicions are justified. 
In 1961, SAP No. 30, Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor in 
the Examination of Financial Statements (AICPA 1961), set forth the auditor's respon-
sibilities for fraud detection in substantial detail. That SAP, as codified in SAP No. 33, 
contained the following guidance: 
• In an audit, the auditor is aware that fraud may exist. 
• The auditor recognizes that, if a fraud is sufficiently material, it may affect the 
opinion and considers this possibility. 
• A n audit is not designed and cannot be relied on to disclose defalcations or 
misrepresentations by management; failure to detect fraud is only a problem 
insofar as it results from the failure to comply with G A A S . 
• Detecting fraud is the responsibility of the accounting system and system of 
internal accounting control; the auditor evaluates the system of internal 
accounting control to determine the selection and timing of other auditing 
procedures. 
• The cost of searching for fraud would be prohibitive and the exercise would, in 
some cases, be futile. 
• If the auditor suspects fraud, he or she needs to determine the possible magni-
tude. 
• If the magnitude is likely to be material, the auditor should reach an under-
standing with the client as to who wi l l investigate it and determine its 
magnitude. 
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• If the magnitude is not likely to be material, the auditor should refer it to the 
proper representatives of the client with the suggestion that they follow up. 
• Subsequent discovery of fraud does not necessarily indicate substandard audit 
work; the auditor has fulfilled his or her responsibility if the audit was 
performed with due care and skill in accordance with G AA S. 
This discussion was carried forward to SAS  No. 1, section 110.05-.08. 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16: In the early to mid 1970's, the 
Auditing Standards Executive Committee (AudSEC) reconsidered the auditor's 
responsibility to detect fraud. This reconsideration was spurred by, among other 
things, the report of the AICPA's Special Committee on Equity Funding and the 
growing recognition that the public considered fraud detection an important objective 
of an audit. As a result, AudSEC,  in 1977, issued SAS No. 16, The Independent 
Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities (AICPA 1977). 
SAS  No. 16 made thefollowing changes to authoritative literature: 
• Expanded guidance to address errors in addition to irregularities. 
• Added the concept hat financial statement users look to internal control 
together with audits to provide assurance about the financial statements. 
• Restated the auditor's responsibility affirmatively; that is, rather than state what 
the auditor is not responsible for, state what the auditor is responsible for－to 
plan the audit to search for material errors and irregularities. 
• Added the concept of professional skepticism 
• Added a discussion of the interrelationship of controls and errors and irregulari-
ties, compliance testing (reliance) and substantive testing (from SAS No. 1, 
section 320). 
• Included warning signals-circumstances suggesting the potential for errors or 
irregularities. 
• Added discussions of the importance of management integrity and warning 
signals suggesting potential for management misrepresentation, but not that, 
absent information to the contrary, the auditor may assume no misrepresenta-
tions (or verriding of controls) has occurred. 
• Strengthened the discussion of the inherent limitations of an audit and stated 
that, no matter how much work the auditor does, he or she will fail to detect 
some types of irregularities or misrepresentations. 
• Made more specific the auditor's obligations and procedures when the auditor 
suspects material errors or irregularities. Whereas SAP No. 30 only required 
that the auditor reach an understanding with the client as to who will investigate 
them, SAS No. 16 specified the level of management to be contacted, require-
ments to obtain evidential matter, implications for the auditor's report, and 
further actions. 
• Specified to whom the auditor should report immaterial errors or irregularities 
and stated that the auditor should consider their effect on other facets of the 
audit. 
SEC  Reaction to SAS No. 16: A l l of the SEC's comments on the exposure draft of 
SAS  No. 16 were incorporated in the final standard except one. The SEC  believed "it 
would be useful to include a comment to the effect that many errors and irregularities 
will be discovered by an auditor standing back from the detail and considering an 
enterprise, its environment, and itsfinancial statements in the overall." Although that 
guidance was not specifically incorporated in SAS No. 16, SAS No. 23, Analytical 
Review Procedures, noted that analytical procedures may be performed at or ne r the 
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conclusion of the engagement as an overall review of financial information. 
Subsequently, SAS No. 56, Analytical Procedures, removed the option and required 
that analytical procedures be used in the overall review of the financial statements in 
the final review stage of the audit. 
Cohen Commission: In 1978, the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities: 
Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations, (Cohen Commission 1978) was 
published－about a year after SAS  No. 16. The report made a number of recommenda-
tions regarding the auditor's responsibilities to detect fraud: 
• Provide explicit guidance on the appropriate exercise of professional skill and 
care concerning fraud detection. For example, if an audit is conducted with due 
care, the auditor will discover certain types of irregularities, should they exist. A 
reasonable search for irregularities is necessary to provide an important service. 
A  standard of professional skill and care is needed to evaluate the performance 
of auditors. 
• Require periodic review of existing clients for determination as to continuance. 
If there is any doubt about management integrity, the auditor should take all 
reasonable actions to resolve the doubt because, if management is not trust-
worthy, there is a significant likelihood that an audit cannot be performed. (SAS 
No. 7 requires investigation when taking on a new client. There are no G A A S 
requirements concerning existing clients. Quality Control Standard No. 1 
requires consideration of policies regarding continuance of clients.) 
• Require auditors to study and evaluate internal controls that have a significant 
bearing on the prevention and detection of fraud. 
• Form a special AICPA  to analyze fraud cases and advice on their effect on 
auditing standards. 
Subcommittee  on Fraud: The Standing Subcommittee on Methods of 
Perpetration and Detection of Fraud was charged to study and publish analyses of 
fraud cases to consider how such ases affect the need for revised or new auditing 
standards. The subcommittee was created as a result of the Cohen Commissio  
recommendation discussed in the previous section. Although the subcommittee accu-
mulated a large data b se of reported cases, its only tangible product was a list of 16 
warning signals of fraud, which was published in the May 12, 1979 CPA Letter. In 
addition, the subcommittee advised other AICPA  components, for example the CPE 
division, on projects involving fraud and it reviewed the research th t was eventually 
published as the Report of the Study of EDP-Related Fraud in the Banking and 
Insurance Industries. 
The subcommittee disbanded in 1981 due, in large part, to its inability to obtain 
specific information from CPA  firms regarding frauds detected. When the AICPA's 
Special Investigations Committee was established, it had the abilityo obtain that 
information more effectively than the subcommittee and the latter was deemed un-
necessary. 
SAS  No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and 
Irregularities: During the early 1980's, several events occurred that prompted the 
Auditing Standards Board (ASB) to reconsider its authoritative position on the 
auditor's responsibility to detect fraud and on related technical guidance. The two 
predominant events were a number of well-publicized business failures and the 
Dingell hearings, which were kindled by those failures as well. These events caused 
the profession to question whether it had accepted sufficient responsibility to find 
fraud and whether it had been effective enough in uncovering it. 
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The ASB's response to these questions was SAS No. 53 (AICPA 1988). That SAS 
expanded the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud. In simple terms, the SAS 
elevated this responsibility by changing it from one of looking for fraud to one of 
detecting it. In the more precise language of the standards, SAS No. 16 required the 
auditor to plan the audit to search for fraud, while SAS No. 53 requires the auditor to 
provide reasonable assurance of detecting it. 
The overall tone of the two standards also differs. SAS No. 53 couches the 
auditor's responsibility in a much more affirmative manner than SAS No. 16 by deem-
phasizing the inherent limitations of an audit. It also discarded the SAS No. 16 notion 
that auditors could assume management was honest unless there was information to 
the contrary. It replaced this notion with a requirement that the auditor make a 
specific assessment of the risk of management misrepresentations-assuming neither 
management's honesty nor dishonesty. 
SAS No. 53 also provided much more specific guidance about the effect of fraud 
on auditors' reports and on their communications both within and outside the entity. In 
addition, SAS No. 53 strengthened the guidance about planning and performing the 
audit and evaluating audit results. Because these latter requirements are discussed 
extensively in the another section of this paper, they are not detailed here. 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting: The National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (National 1987) was a private sector 
initiative jointly sponsored by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
American Accounting Association, Financial Executives Institute, Institute of Internal 
Auditors, and Institute of Management Accountants. Its objective was to identify the 
incidence, causes, and potential remedies relative to fraudulent financial reporting and 
consider the roles of relevant bodies, including independent auditors, entity manage-
ment and employees, educators, and regulatory and enforcement agencies. 
The Treadway Commission was formed in large part as a response to public 
concerns, including those of legislators, about business failures in which fraudulent 
financial reporting was believed to be involved. The Commission performed a large 
part of its work concurrently with the development of SAS No. 53, and, as a result, the 
SAS incorporated to some extent most of the Commission's recommendations as they 
related to the independent auditors' detection of fraud. These recommendations were: 
• Restate the auditor's responsibility for detecting fraud to require reasonable 
assurance that it is detected. 
• Provide guidance to improve the auditor's ability to detect fraud. 
• Strengthen the quality of audit management. 
• Improve communications with users about the nature, scope, and limitations of 
an audit. 
Public Oversight Board: The Public Oversight Board (POB) is the most recent of 
the profession's bodies to issue recommendations concerning the auditor's responsi-
bility to detect fraud. In a 1993 report (POB 1993), the POB said "...to a greater 
extent than it now does, the profession must accept responsibility for the detection of 
fraud by management." To that end, the POB made the following specific recom-
mendations: 
• The profession should develop a process to analyze alleged audit failures to 
determine their causes and to develop enhanced risk assessment and procedural 
guidance. 
• The profession should strengthen its emphasis on professional skepticism. 
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Other Recent Initiatives: Recent actions concerning the auditor's respon ibility to 
detect fraud confirms that its evolution is continuing－that concern and confusion 
about the nature and adequacy of the guidance in SAS  No. 53 remains. In May 1992, 
the AICPA  held an Expectations Gap Conference to assess the progress of the nine 
expectation gap standards issued in 1988. The discussion of SAS  No. 53 during that 
roundtable (Albrecht and Willingham 1992) indicated hat SAS No. 53 may not be 
adequately addressing fraud detection. 
The AICPA's Board of Directors issued a report in 1993 (AICPA 1993) stating that 
"The public looks to the independent auditor to detect fraud, and it is the auditor's 
responsibility to do so." This statement was intended not only as a response to 
lingering public concerns about auditors' detection responsibility, but also as a 
reminder to the profession about what its responsibility is. That report also supported 
the POB's recommendations pertaining to fraud detection, cited above, and pledged 
action to implement them. 
In a related step, the January, 1994 CPA  Letter, contained a discussion of fraud be-
cause "it is clear th t some members are still confused about their responsibility－and 
some commentators have objected to the position of the AICPA  Board of Directors on 
the matter." 
As a culmination to continuing skepticism about SAS No. 53, the ASB  recently 
appointed a fraud task force to reexamine that SAS  and determine whether it should 
be revised or supplemented. 
Influences Outside the Accounting Profession 
A  number of groups outside the accounting profession have influenced profes-
sional guidance pertaining to the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud. They include 
audit report users, legislators and regulators, the courts, and thefinancial press. These 
groups have often interacted with each other, one group f eling the concerns of others. 
Almost without exception, the concerns and actions of hese groups were triggered by 
financial losses suffered by investors and creditors that, at least in part, were blamed 
on fraudulent financial reporting and failed audits. 
Initiatives from these groups have taken a wide variety of forms including investi-
gations by three Congressional subcommittees, proposed legislation, legal decisions, 
and op ed pieces in prominent fi ancial and business publications. Although a review 
of these initiatives is far beyond the scope of this paper, their collectiveeffect demon-
strates the public perception that auditors should detect fraud. 
Actions by these groups have, indeed, influenced the profession's consideration of 
its fraud detection responsibility. The timing of the Moss (1976) and Metcalf (1977) 
hearings and the issuance of SAS  No. 16 in 1977 was not coincidental. Neither were 
the Dingell hearings in the mid 1980's, the TreadwayCommission deliberations of 
that same period, and the issuance of SAS  No. 53 in 1988 random events. The public 
has influenced the evolution of the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud, and it 
continues to. 
The Risk Model and Fraud Detection 
SAS  No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and 
Irregularities, employs the audit risk model to frame the auditor's responsibility to 
detect fraud. The auditor is required to assess the risk that errors and irregularities may 
cause the financial statements to contain a material misstatement. The SAS requires 
the auditor to consider factors that influence this risk (hereafter referred to as fraud 
risk factors). It provides examples of th e factors that the auditor may consider that 
146 
pertain to both the financial statement level (all or several financial statement compo-
nents) and the account balance or transaction class leve (individual financial 
statement components). 
The  Theory of Fraud Risk Factors 
The  fundamental theory underlying fraudrisk factors (also referred to as red flags, 
indicators, characteristics) is that their presence may portend an increased likelihood 
of fraud induced misstatements in the financial statements. This theory underlies the 
risk model approach set forth in SAS  53. 
A  respectable amount of research, both in academia and professional practice, has 
been devoted to the theory and application of fraud risk factors (for example, 
Albrecht, et al 1980; Albrecht and Romney 1986; Albrecht and Willingham 1992; 
Campbell and Parker 1992; Loebbecke et. al. 1989; National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987; Pincus 1989). Research efforts directed toward 
this theory have addressed various aspects of fraud risk factors including identifying 
them, classifying them, weighting them, combining them, and testing their predictive 
effectiveness. 
The  bulk of research, practice experience, and anecdotal history indicates hat frau  
risk factors－those inSAS  No. 53, as well as other combinations－are undependable as 
cues for fraud induced misstatements. This body of evidence challenges the adequacy 
of the guidance inSAS  No. 53 and strongly suggests that additional or, perhaps, alter-
native guidance should be developed. 
Limitations of Fraud Risk Factors 
A  number of attributes limit the reliability of fraud risk factors, and therefore the 
audit risk model, in predicting fraud induced misstatements. The following discussion 
briefly describes what we believe to be the most significant limiting attributes. 
Recognition and consideration of these attributes potentially can aid in improving 
audit guidance for fraud detection. 
Inappropriate Risk Factors: Several research studies have addressed the question 
of which fraud risk factors are most effective in predicting fraud induced misstate-
ments (for example, Albrecht and Willingham 1992; Loebbecke et al 1989; and Pincus 
1989). Most of these studies have concluded that SAS No. 53 contains some risk 
factors that are not effective predictors and excludes some factors that are. Research, 
however, has not yet constructed a set of risk factors with sufficient predictive ability 
to correctly categorize frauds and nonfrauds in an audit. Therefore, auditors applying 
No. SAS No. 53 are faced with a relatively long list of risk factors with varying 
degrees of predictive success, many of which are always present in an audit client. As 
a result, we believe, many auditors doubt the credibility of fraud risk factors in 
detecting fraud. 
Further, some auditors have expressed concern that a requirement to consider 
imprecise fraud risk factors raises their exposure to litigation substantially more than 
it increases their l kelihood of detecting fraud. In their view, this added legal risk 
arises when they have dutifully considered risk factors, responded with appropriate 
audit modifications, not detected fraud induced misstatements, and, after issuing an 
unqualified opinion, fraud is discovered. 
Combining and Weighting Risk Factors: In addition to the issue of which risk 
factors are accurate indicators of fraud, the question also exists as to how to combine 
or categorize these factors and what relative weights to assign them. SAS No. 53 
states that the factors should be combined, but provides no related guidance. Some 
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research has delved into the combination issue by creating classes or categories of 
factors, such as situational, opportunity, and personal honesty (Albrecht et al 1980) 
and conditions, motivation, and attitude (Loebbecke et al 1989). However, these
research results have not been refined and tested suffici ntly to demonstrate their 
effectiveness as fraud predictors. 
Even if relevant fraud risk factors can be identified, their application is mi ed by
the auditor's lack of knowledge about their relative significance in diagnosing fraud 
induced misstatements. The only study we are aware ofthat addressed "weighting" 
risk factors isAlbrecht and Willingham, 1992, which used statistical models to eval-
uate weightings. That study concluded that "The weight that should be assigned to 
each relevant fraud indicator in combining them is a very complex problem. Based on 
research results, guidance about combination of fraud indicators is beyond the ca-
pability of an SAS.... [W]hile the models are somewhat accurate at both the very low 
and very high risk levels, they aresignificantly ess accurate when therisk is deter-
mined to be low, moderate, andhigh. In every risk case, misinterpretations about 
whether fraud existed were present." 
Some  public accounting firms avoid the issue ofcombining risk factors by requiring 
a response to any risk factor present. In essence, this approach requires the auditor to 
consider whether "other conditions" might offset or augment the lik lihood of fraud. 
We  believe the practical problems of combining and weighting fraud risk factors is 
a significant limitation of the utility of the risk model approach in SAS 53. We hope 
that future research will address these problems and help alleviate them. 
Inability to Target Specific Misstatements: Fraud risk factors, those in SAS  No. 
53 and others, are intended to predict the presence of fraud. If and when a set of rele-
vant, properly combined and weighted risk factors is developed, it can, atbest, only 
accurately predict that fraud has occurred. These factors cannot direct the auditor to 
financial statement components where fraud induced misstatements exist. SAS  No. 53 
implicitly recognizes this limitation by the guidance it provides concerning the 
auditor's response to a significant risk of misstatement. That guidance instructs the 
auditor to exercise a heightened degree of professional skepticism by considering the 
appropriateness of the experience and expertise of audit staff assigned to the audit; the 
extensiveness of audit supervision that may be necessary; and the modification of the 
nature, timing, and extent ofauditing procedures to provide more persuasive evidence. 
The  auditor, however, still faces the perplexing problem of where to aim this added 
audit intensity. Often the spectrum of financial statement components susceptible to 
fraud induced misstatements is so broadthat a massive portion of the financial state-
ments must be subjected to utmost scrutiny. We believe that the additional time, cost, 
and risk related to detecting specific misstatements when ri k factors point to fraud 
has caused an increased tendency for auditors to withdraw from audit engagements or 
decline to accept clients where these factors are present. In hese circumstances, audi-
tors' concerns about management integrity and the need to rely on management 
representations, particularly concerning the completeness assertion, requires switching 
to a "fraud audit" audit strategy. Because such a strategy is extremely costly, the 
auditor usually cannot contract to do the necessary work. Thus, the auditor withdraws 
from the engagement. While these actions are not necessarily inappropriate, they do 
emphasize the need for risk factors that are better able to target specific financial state-
ment components. 
Management  Manipulation of Risk Factors: Fraud risk factors are subject to 
management manipulation. Management is aware of the factors auditors consider in 
assessing the risk of fraud－in many cases CFOs or other top executives have been 
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auditors with CPA  firms－and is able to distort or play down riskfactors to mislead 
auditors. A recent example of risk factor manipulation occurred in theZZZZ  Best Co. 
where the CEO led auditors to address risk areas that really were not risky. This 
directed auditors away from legitimate risk areas and helped perpetuate the conceal-
ment of fraudulent financial reporting. 
SAS  No. 53 "Misstatement" Risk Factors: In addition to the limitations of fraud 
risk factors discussed above, the manner in which SAS  No. 53 guides the auditor's use 
of risk factors creates other limitations. SAS No. 53 discusses ri k factors as indica-
tors of potential misstatements. Misstatements defined in the SAS  include both errors 
and irregularities, the latter being subdivided into management fraud and defalcations. 
Because SAS No. 53 presents risk factors as signals of potential misstatements, the 
auditor must decide whether a particular combination of risk factors indicates errors 
(unintentional misstatements) or irregularities (intentional misstatements). If the 
auditor concludes that irregularities are likely, then he or she must make an additional 
judgment about whether they take the form of management fraud or defalcations. 
The  condition－error, management fraud, or defalcation－causing the misstatement 
is significant. It affects how the auditor should respond to achieve reasonable assur-
ance of detecting the misstatement. When the underlying cause of the misstatement is 
intentional, as with management fraud and defalcations, the auditor's response should 
consider that accounting principles and audit evidence may have been manipulated to 
conceal or support the misstatement. When, on the other hand, the underlying cause is 
unintentional, as with errors, the auditor generally has less concern about the credi-
bility of audit evidence. In addition, the audit approach to respond to expected 
management fraud is likely to differ from the approach to respond to expected defal-
cations. Neither SAS  No. 53 nor research on risk factors provides adequate guidance 
about how such factors might indicate the underlying cause of misstatements. 
SAS  No. 53 does contain a brief discussion of management fraud. It requires a 
specific assessment of the risk of management misrepresentation. This assessment is 
in addition to and secondary to the requirement that the auditor assess the risk of 
material misstatement. The SAS provides additional factors tha an auditor may 
consider that pertain specifically to this risk. Presumably, the auditor should incorpo-
rate this secondary risk assessment-risk of management misrepresentation－into the 
formation of the primary isk assessment-risk of material misstatements. However, 
the SAS does not mention the interrelationship of the two risks, much less provide 
guidance about integrating them. 
The  Risk Model, Reasonable Assurance, and Nature of Misstatements 
SAS  No. 53 requires the auditor to understand the characteristics of errors and 
irregularities and their interaction when assessing the riskof misstatement. Those 
characteristics-materiality, level of involvement, concealment, internal control struc-
ture, and financial statement effect－(discussed in the Appendix to the SAS) are 
discussed in the context of how they influence the auditor's abil y to detect misstate-
ments. The discussion states that the existence of some of these characteristics may 
make some misstatements extremely difficult, if not impossible, to detect. 
By  introducing these characteristics into the auditor's risk assessment, SAS  No. 53 
raises the question as to whether the auditor is able to detect all misstatements, what-
ever their characteristics, with the same level of assurance. We believe that the SAS 
and a substantial majority of auditors take the position that all misstatements, what-
ever their nature or characteristics, cannot be detected with the same level of 
assurance. 
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On the other hand, the auditor's standard report, prescribed in SAS No. 58, Reports 
on Audited Financial Statements, requires a statement that the audit provides reason-
able assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatements. Neither SAS No. 58 nor the standard report, differentiate among levels 
of assurance for misstatements by nature or characteristics. 
These two standards send different messages. We think that report readers believe 
that the auditor is responsible for and can detect all misstatements, irrespective of 
whether they are errors, management fraud, or defalcations, with the same level of 
assurance, while auditors do not. In other words, auditors believe that what is a 
"reasonable" level of assurance for detecting a misstatement varies with the nature of 
the misstatement while report readers believe that this "reasonable" level of assurance 
is the same for all misstatements. This certainly widens the expectation gap and, we 
believe, should be specifically addressed in auditing standards. 
Improving the Auditor's Fraud Detection Capability 
In this section we present some suggestions for strengthening the auditor's ability 
to detect fraud. These suggestions concern both changes in auditing standards and 
changes in practice and, in varying degrees, involve practitioners, standard setters, and 
academics in their implementation. Some of these suggestions are being considered 
by the ASB's newly formed fraud task force. 
Unambiguous Statement of Responsibility to Detect Fraud 
We believe many auditors are still unsure or unaccepting of the responsibility for 
detecting fraud that is set forth in SAS No. 53. On the historical timeline, as noted 
earlier, the responsibility to detect fraud is new. Changing the old, entrenched belief 
among auditors that they are not responsible for detecting fraud will require additional 
effort. We believe one effective method would be to specifically use the term "fraud" 
in auditing standards. Using the term irregularities and lumping it into misstatements 
has obscured the auditor's understanding of the responsibility SAS No. 53 imposes. 
We also believe that a restated responsibility should help the public to better under-
stand the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud. The public needs to understand that 
detecting all material fraud induced misstatements is beyond auditors' capability. 
Auditors should have an affirmative responsibility to detect fraud, but it should be 
articulated in a manner that clearly explains the concept of reasonable assurance and, 
to the extent possible, sets forth that concept in an operational manner. We believe the 
responsibility to detect fraud is analogous to the responsibility of police officers to 
find criminals. It would be absurd for police officers to deny such a responsibility, but 
it would be unreasonable to expect them to always find criminals. We believe that the 
public understands and accepts this for police officers but not for auditors. Restating 
the auditor's responsibility for fraud more precisely and coherently in professional 
standards could help achieve this understanding and acceptance. 
Refining the Audit Risk Model 
Despite the limitations of the audit risk model discussed in the preceding section, 
we do not advocate its abandonment. We believe that continued research and distilla-
tion of practice experience to attenuate the limitations are critical to enhancing the 
auditor's ability to detect fraud. 
The highest priority should be given to identifying factors that are relevant and reli-
able predictors of fraud. We hope that factors could be identified that correlate 
specifically with fraud instead of fraud and error combined. In addition, we believe 
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that fraud risk factors capable of reliably predicting the risk of fraud in specific finan-
cial statement components can and should be developed. Knowledge about such 
factors would significantly improve the effectiveness of the risk model approach in 
detecting fraud. 
In addition to considering fraud risk factors for specific financial statement compo-
nents, we believe that auditors should simply ask themselves which financial 
statement component(s) would be a desirable area for executing fraud. This differs 
from merely considering specific risk factors in that the auditor attempts to identify 
the area where he or she would conceal a fraud if one were to be perpetrated. It has 
the added benefit of not being directly related to risk factors and, therefore, not as 
susceptible to the client's anticipation of where the auditor might focus additional 
audit effort. In addition, it would help compensate for the client's knowledge of the 
audit approach gained when firm staff accept positions with client entities. 
Evidence About Fraud 
In a number of circumstances involving fraudulent financial reporting, auditors had 
ample evidence of fraud but failed to adequately recognize its implications or 
follow-up on the questions that evidence raised. We believe that additional profes-
sional guidance is needed about audit evidence implications and evaluation. 
One important area this guidance should address is evidence manipulation in fraud 
schemes. Knowledge of the characteristics, indicators, and methods of distorting 
manipulated evidence would sharpen the auditors' evaluation of audit evidence and 
help to concentrate their attention on specific financial statement components where 
fraud induced misstatements may exist. In addition, this knowledge would help in 
developing audit procedures directed specifically toward determining whether 
evidence has been manipulated. 
We believe that two fruitful sources of information about manipulated evidence are 
the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and litigated fraud cases. 
Both of these sources have been used in identifying fraud risk indicators. They could 
be used in a similar fashion to glean knowledge about evidence manipulation. In addi-
tion, the process recommended by the POB involving analyzing information in CPA 
firm workpapers about alleged audit failures is another important source of informa-
tion. Both practitioners and academics could contribute significantly to developing 
this knowledge. 
We also recommend that the profession create a formal process for collecting and 
disseminating information from individual CPA firms about the audit techniques that 
have been successful in detecting fraud. We believe that much useful information could 
be captured by studying the profession's success stories in detecting fraud in the thou-
sands of audits that do not end up on the front pages of the business and financial press. 
Identifying and publishing how these frauds were devised, the techniques employed to 
perpetrate them, and the evidence and auditing procedures that led to their detection 
during the audit would enable the profession as a whole to gain from these experiences. 
In addition, this process would better position the profession to answer its critics who 
focus on the shortcomings of the audits that were not successful. 
The recent K P M G Peat Marwick fraud survey ( K P M G Peat Marwick 1993), using 
companies rather than CPA firms, is an example of how such a process might be 
established. That survey provided information from companies about the frequency of 
fraud, types of frauds, how they occurred, and how they were discovered, among 
many other fraud attributes. Similar information from CPA firms would be a fertile 
source of knowledge for the profession. 
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Auditor Response to Risk Factors 
When  risk factors indicate a risk of fraud induced misstatements, auditors often 
respond by strengthening the nature, iming, or extent of audit procedures. One 
response is to apply analytical procedures to help targetpotential financial statement 
components. Experience suggests that such procedures often are not effective because 
management is able to respond with explanations that can be corroborated and yet 
misleading. 
Another common response to the risk of fraud is to strengthen tests of details. This 
approach, however, has also been ineffective. Often, these sts fail because the 
transactions or events used to perpetrate fraud occur late in the fiscal year. Auditors 
have examined many such items already and found no problems. Thus, they are lulled 
into complacency by past positive experience and f il to recognize the very items they 
are looking for. 
We  believe SAS No. 53 should be revised or supplemented to provide more 
specific guidance about appropriate audit testing responses and their application. 
Audit Staffing 
We  also believe that changes in approaches to audit staffing might be beneficial in 
improving the auditor's ability to detect fraud. The profession has developed and used 
specialists for quite some time in individual industries. Today, there is increased 
emphasis on training and using such specialists. We believe the notion of specializa-
tion should be expanded. Public accounting firms should consider creating staff 
specialization in certain financial statement areas. This specialization w uld pertain 
not just to specific industries, but also to specific financial statement components, 
such as valuation of certain assets or liabilities. Such specialities would provide exper-
tise that would enhance the auditor's ability to detect fraud. 
We  believe such specialization would be helpful because today's audits are analo-
gous to an assembly process where junior staff get experience in a particular audit 
area, such as receivables and inventory, by participating in audits of those reas for 
two or three clients. They then are assigned to otherfinancial statement components in 
other audits to gain experience in those areas. It is not uncommon for a staff person to 
become a senior and have been exposed to a particular financial statement area only 
once. 
This process often does not provide sufficient exposure to audit areas to a equately 
prepare junior staff to recognize circumstances that may involve fraud. Yet frequently 
the work that is critical to detecting fraud is the basic auditing performed by these 
staff members. A lack of depth of experience in specific audit areas m y cause them to 
overlook important matters relevant to fraud that, therefore, will not be brought to the 
attention of more senior staff who could bring their greater expertise to bear on these 
matters. 
We  recognize that this training approach may be impracticable to change, but we 
believe that specialization in f nancial statement areas could help overcome some of 
the disadvantages associated with this approach. 
Summary 
There is an old a age that a primary reason for studying history is to avoid repeating 
it. The profession's history of defining the auditor's responsibility for detecting fraud 
already contains too much repetition. A trend, however, is developing and th re does 
not seem to be room for a U turn－auditors are responsible for detecting fraud. 
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This is a hefty responsibility and it must be defined in the context of the auditor's 
capability to detect fraud. The profession has had mixed success in achieving a 
reasonable blend of responsibility and capability. We believe that continued research 
and practice experience to refine the audit risk model, better analysis of audits 
involving fraud (successful as well as unsuccessful), a clearer definition and descrip-
tion of the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud, and changes in staff training and 
specialization can help make responsibility commensurate with capability. 
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